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The Golden Rule of Texas
1
"What you do not want done to yourself, do not do to others."
The Golden Rule is a universal ethical norm that has been taught by
Jesus, Confucius, and Aristotle,2 and it has been described as the
foundation upon which the natural moral law of human behavior is
established.3
In 2003, the Texas Legislature provided its own interpretation of the
ages-old Golden Rule. As amended, the Golden Rule of Texas reads:
"He who has the gold makes the rules, without regard for what is done to
others." The Texas Legislature's new ethical watchword was prominently
displayed as the members of both chambers engaged in a prolonged
redistricting saga to redraw Texas's thirty-two congressional districts in a
blatant partisan power play.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Redistricting is the process by which the boundary lines of congressional districts within a particular state are redrawn, created, or eliminated to adjust for relative shifts and growth in population among
congressional districts. Redistricting promotes equal representation in
the U.S. House of Representatives based on the population of the state.
Article 1, Section 2, of the United States Constitution requires the federal
government to conduct a census every ten years, in part, for the purpose
of allocating the number of seats to the U.S. House of Representatives
each state may have.4 The most recent census was taken on April 1,
1. See W. Patrick Cunningham, The Golden Rule as Universal Ethical Norm, 17 J.
Bus. E'mics 105, 105 (1998) (quoting the Golden Rule).
2. See id. (noting that the Golden Rule has been featured in one form or another, in
the teachings of most religious and philosophical writers over a very lengthy period of time
in human history).
3. See id. at 108 (explaining that "[t]he Golden Rule continues to stand as a universal
expression of the highest ethic, an encoding of the natural moral law, and a fulfillment of
both the Mosaic and Christian ideals of behavior").
4. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2.
The House of Representatives shall be composed of members chosen every second
Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each State shall have the
Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legis-
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2000.1 Census data determines how the 435 congressional seats will be
apportioned 6 to each of the fifty states. The Texas Legislature typically
redraws congressional district boundaries during the first regular session
after publication of the federal decennial census.7
In 2001, Republicans controlled the governor's mansion and the Texas
Senate, but the Democrats maintained their historical majority in the
Texas House. 8 The two chambers of the Legislature failed to reach a consensus on congressional redistricting, and to produce a map of new congressional districts that would reflect the updated census data. In federal
court, 9 a panel consisting of three federal judges ratified a version of the
map that had been drawn following the 1990 census, but modified it to
include the two new seats that Texas was apportioned because the population of Texas increased, relative to the nation as a whole, substantially
between 1990 and 2000.

lature .... Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several
States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed,
three fifths of all other Persons. The actual Enumeration shall be made within three
Years after the first Meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every
subsequent Term of ten Years, in such Manner as they shall by Law direct. Id.
5. See Texas Secretary of State Webpage, http://www.sos.state.tx.us/elections/voter/
faqcensus.shtml (last visited Feb. 25, 2007) (noting that the most recent state-wide data
collected by the U.S. Census Bureau in the state of Texas was during the year 2000).
6. See BERNARD COHEN, SCIENCE AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS: SCIENCE IN THE
POLITICAL THOUGHT OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, JOHN ADAMS

&

JAMES MADISON 90 (1995) (discussing how Thomas Jefferson and Alexander Hamilton
debated which method should be established to round the fractions up for purposes of
apportioning congressional districts among the states).
7. See Texas Secretary of State Webpage, http://www.sos.state.tx.us/elections/voterl
faqcensus.shtml (last visited Mar. 4, 2007) (discussing Texas law and legislative history that
requires the Legislature to "redistrict Texas' congressional districts. The Texas Legislature
usually redistricts congressional districts at the first regular session after publication of the
federal decennial census .... ").
8. See Jeffrey Toobin, Drawing the Line, THE NEW YORKER, Mar. 6, 2006, availableat
http://www.newyorker.com/printables/fact/060306fa-fact (discussing the Texas House of
Representatives as then being the last bastion of Democratic power in a state government
otherwise dominated by Republican officeholders).
9. See id. ("A deadlock between the two legislative bodies prevented Texas from
adopting any redistricting plan, and the conflict ended up in federal court."). "The following year, a three-judge panel, ill-disposed to take sides in a political fight, ratified a modified version of the 1991 map, with two new seats awarded to high-growth districts." Id.
"'The court essentially carried forward the 1991 Democratic gerrymander of Texas, which
is increasingly problematic, given the over-all Republican tilt of the state,' Samuel Issacharoff, a professor at New York University School of Law, told me." Id. "The statusquo ante looked like a distortion." Id.
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In the 2002 Texas state representative elections, then-U.S. Rep. Tom
DeLay sought to sweep the Democrats out of the majority in the Texas
House of Representatives. In pursuit of his goal, U.S. Rep. DeLay created two political action committees (PACs) which amassed $3.4 million
and distributed the funds among twenty-two races for the Texas House.' 0
On Election Day in 2002, Republicans took control as the majority party
for the first time since Reconstruction in the Texas House of Representatives." After a bitter political battle and rancorous debate on the issue,' 2
H.B. 313 was enacted by the 78th Legislature, 3rd Called Session on October 12, 2003.14 The Republican-controlled Texas Legislature finally had
possession of the gold-and they clearly demonstrated that they would
make the rules.
H.B. 3 altered the congressional districts in Texas in a way that would
benefit Republican congressional candidates in the 2004 election and beyond. The new congressional districts map compromised the substantive
value of the votes of millions of Texas African-American and Latino citi10. See id.
In the 2002 elections, DeLay set out to give the Texas House a Republican majority
and thus remove the last obstacle to full Republican control of the state. That year, he
created two PACs, which raised and spent $3.4 million on twenty-two races for the
Texas House. The law firm of Jack Abramoff, the lobbyist whom DeLay has described
as one of his "closest and dearest friends," contributed twenty-five thousand dollars to
the cause. On October 4, 2002, the DeLay PAC known as Texans for a Republican
Majority sent a hundred and ninety thousand dollars to seven candidates for the State
House. The following month, all seven were elected, and Republicans became the
majority party in the Texas House. Id.
11. See Clay Robison, It's a Grand Old Sweep, Hous. CHRON., Nov. 6, 2002, at Al,
available at 2002 WLNR 13653547 ("Republicans swept the other statewide races and ...
were gaining a majority in the Texas House for the first time since Reconstruction.").
12. See CNN.com, Texas House Paralyzed by Democratic Walkout, http://
www.cnn.com/2003/ALLPOLITICS/05/13/texas.legislature/index.html (last visited Feb. 25,
2007).
The Democrats are trying to thwart a GOP redistricting plan they say is being pushed
by U.S. Rep. Tom DeLay, the majority leader in the U.S. House of Representatives
and a Texan. Democrats call the plan "an outrageous partisan power grab." They
have gathered in Ardmore, just across the state line and beyond the jurisdiction of
Texas state police, whom the House's Republican majority has ordered to bring them
back to the state Capitol. "We're here in Ardmore, Oklahoma, because the real
problems of Texas are budget problems, are school finance problems, are health care
problems that are being cast aside because of a power play by Tom DeLay," [one state
representative] said. "We are here trying to get Texas government back on the right
path." Id.
13. Tex. H.B. 3, 78th Leg., 3rd C.S. (2003) (referring to the legislation that contained
the enacted redistricting plan and map).
14. See Texas Redistricting 2000-2006 News Items, http://www.tlc.state.tx.us/redist/
doc/00-03redistnews.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2007) (indicating that H.B. 3 was enacted by
the 3rd Called Session of the 78th Texas Legislature on October 12, 2003).
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zens, many of whom had struggled for generations to build voting coalitions across racial and ethnic lines. 15 In three of the newly drawn
congressional districts, African-Americans' votes were marginalized by
being placed in noncompetitive districts.16 In Texas other twenty-nine
newly drawn congressional districts, "minority voters [had]1 7no position to
influence outcomes, let alone elect candidates of choice.'
"African-American and Latino voters [who previously had a strong
voice in deciding who represented them] [now] found themselves in districts represented by Anglo Republicans with dismal records of responsiveness to minority
voters' concerns-and no incentive to [represent
18
minorities] better.,
Ultimately, the Republican-controlled Texas Legislature's redistricting
plan produced its intended result and Republicans reached a majority of
the state's congressional delegation for the first time since Reconstruction, ousting several senior Democrats from Congress in the process. 19
There is no doubt that Republicans emerged victorious, but they did so
only by compromising the political and democratic viability of their fellow Texans.
This comment will address the role of the 2003 Texas redistricting saga
in diluting the voting power, reducing the representation, and violating
the constitutional rights of African-Americans and Latinos in Texas. To
15. See Brief of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Appellants at 12, League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 126 S.
Ct. 2594 (2006) (No. 05-276) (recognizing the phenomenon that there are communities in
which "coalitions are formed among minority groups or small, reliable levels of crossover
voting from white voters that provide certain minorities, who themselves may not comprise
a majority of the voting population, with a reasonable opportunity to elect" candidates of
their choice).
16. See Brief for the Texas State-Area Conference of the NAACP as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Appellants at 11, League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594
(2006) (No. 05-276) (explaining that in those three congressional districts, African Americans' votes are not urgently needed because those House seats were already relatively
"safe").
17. Id. (underscoring that the remaining twenty-nine congressional districts were
home to most of the black citizens in Texas, and that none of those districts provided an
opportunity for African-Americans to influence the congressional elections in those
districts).
18. Id. at 10-11 (explaining how once-empowered African-American and Latino voting communities were disempowered by being divided into congressional districts where
they could be ignored with impunity by the members of Congress elected from those
districts).
19. See Holly Yeager, Texas Republicans in Legal Battle on Voting Maps: The Supreme
Court Is About to Review the ControversialRedrawing of Districts,FIN. TIMES UK, Feb. 28,
2006, at 9, available at 2006 WLNR 3418961 ("New Republican-drawn districts were used
in the 2004 elections and the state's House delegation reflected the change, with Republicans holding 21 seats.").
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that end, the statute establishing the new congressional districts map in
Texas will be analyzed in conjunction with the United States Supreme
20
Court's decision in League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry,
the United States Constitution, and the Voting Rights Act of 1965.21 This
comment will present constructive solutions to remedy the discriminatory
effects that have resulted in the aftermath of the most recent episode of
Texas redistricting.
II.

LEGAL HISTORY

A. How a Texas Redistricting Bill Becomes a Law
During the period between Reconstruction and the early 1970's, Texas
was a thoroughly Democratic state. Political divisions in that era were
not between Democrats and Republicans, but between the conservative
and moderate/liberal wings of the Democratic Party. After President
Lyndon Johnson left the White House in 1969, his Democratic Party began to lose its grip on his Lone Star State, and Texas began its thirty-yearlong transformation into a Republican stronghold.
In 2001, Democrats maintained one final bastion of power in state government: the Texas House of Representatives. It was the Democrats in
the Texas House that fought against the Republican-controlled Texas
Senate which sought to drastically change the Texas congressional districts to benefit Republican candidates in the 2002 elections. Democrats
in the Texas House in 2001 were considered to be conservative by national standards, but they were still viewed as an obstacle to the fulfillment of the ambitions of a powerful Texas Republican in Washington:
U.S. Rep. Tom DeLay.
A conservative, DeLay was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives in 1984. He became known as "The Hammer" for his enforcement
of Republican Party discipline in close votes and his reputation for taking
political retribution on opponents. He was appointed Deputy Minority
Whip in 1988, and was elected House Majority Whip in 1995 after Republicans gained a majority in the U.S. House of Representatives. DeLay
was elected House majority leader after the 2002 midterm elections.
Rep. DeLay was very forthright about his disdain for the Democratcontrolled Texas House, and his desire to redraw the congressional districts to advantage Republicans was equally clear: "I'm the majority

20. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 126 S.Ct. 2594 (2006) (introducing
the United States Supreme Court case that addressed the redistricting actions by the Texas
Legislature in 2003).
21. 42 U.S.C. § (2000).
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leader, and we want more seats,"2 2 DeLay said. Discussing his Democratic colleagues in the House DeLay added, "[t]hey may look at themselves as important. But I look at them as irrelevant., 23 Majority Leader
DeLay obviously wanted new Republican-leaning congressional districts
to increase and protect the Republican majority in the U.S. House.2 4
However, it was not just more Republicans that DeLay wanted in the
U.S. House; DeLay wanted more Texas Republicans on whose vote he
could rely to maintain a position of power.
Rep. DeLay knew how to overcome the obstacle to his ambitions, and
it came in the form of a political action committee. During campaigns for
the 2002 Texas House and Senate elections, a DeLay-controlled PAC
known as Texans for a Republican Majority (TRMPAC) distributed campaign funds into several successful state House campaigns that paved the
way for Republicans to win a majority of the 150 seats in the House. The
new GOP majority elected Midland Republican, and DeLay ally, Tom
Craddick as its new speaker.2 5
Republican Governor Rick Perry welcomed Republican majorities in
both chambers when the new Legislature convened in January of 2003.
Rep. DeLay wasted little time urging the state's legislators, many of
whom he helped elect with TRMPAC funds, to take a redistricting bill
and send more Republicans to Congress from Texas.2 6

22. Todd J. Gillman, DeLay: We Could Do Without a Democrat or 7, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 7, 2003, at 6A (quoting U.S. Rep. Tom DeLay's comments during an inter-

view in which DeLay discussed his purely partisan motivation for redrawing the
congressional districts in Texas).
23. Id. (quoting DeLay's condescension regarding Democratic members of Congress
and his dismissal of their role as a minority party in the political process).
24. See Dave McNeely, Redistricting a Contentious Issue for Texas Legislature, AUSTIN
AM.-STATESMAN, Apr. 24, 2003 ("DeLay's motive for wanting a new map is obvious: increase the number of Republicans in Congress to pad the GOP's current narrow majority.
His office says the map released by Frost is only one of several that have been drafted.").
25. See Guillermo X. Garcia, Redistricting May Sting S.A. Demos; Congressmen Face
Realignments of Their Constituencies, SAN ANTONIo EXPRESS-NEws, May 2, 2003, at 10A.

Democrats, meanwhile, are angry that DeLay, a close ally of Texas House Speaker
and fellow Republican Tom Craddick, is pushing for redistricting a year after a threejudge panel drew congressional lines because the Legislature was unable to agree on a
map. A DeLay-controlled political action committee funneled campaign funds into a
number of successful state house races that allowed the Republicans to win 88 of the
150 House seats. That GOP majority in turn elected Craddick speaker - the first member of his party to hold that post in modem Texas history-"or at least in the last couple
of thousand years," as Craddick jokingly notes. Id.
26. See Chuck Lindell, DeLay: Lawmakers Should Redraw Map of Districts, AUSTIN
AM.-STATESMAN, Feb. 26, 2003, at B2.

The Texas Legislature should draw new congressional districts because the court-mandated map sent too many Democrats to Congress, U.S. House Majority Leader Tom

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University,

7

The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review on Race and Social Justice, Vol. 9 [], No. 3, Art. 2

THE SCHOLAR

[Vol. 9:427

Republicans in the Texas House waited until May, at the end of the
five-month regular legislative session, to take up congressional redistricting. The process began with hearings held by the House committee assigned to redistricting. The hearings were drawn out and contentious,
and several committee members clashed with the committee's chairman,
Republican Rep. Joe Crabb.27 Democratic Rep. Richard Raymond
fought with Rep. Crabb over the manner in which the chairman handled
the public hearings. Rep. Raymond urged Rep. Crabb to hold hearings
outside of Austin, the capital of Texas. Rep. Raymond specifically recommended hearings in communities with large minority populations. Rep.
Crabb refused to hold hearings outside of Austin even after Rep. Raymond threatened to file a complaint with the U.S. Justice Department.2 8
Chairman Crabb explained that, "[t]here are only two people I know of
[sic] on the committee that speak Spanish. The rest of us would have a
very difficult time if we were out in [another] area ... to have committee
hearings and to be able to converse with people that did not speak
English."2 9

On May 6, 2003, the House redistricting committee approved a redistricting bill, H.B. 3398,30 which substantially changed the thirty-two conDeLay said Tuesday. "It does not reflect the people of Texas and where they are right
now .... [57%] of Texans voted for a Republican congressman, yet we have [47%] of
the delegation. That is not what our founding fathers contemplated as reapportionment or redistricting." Texas' [thirty-two] congressional districts were drawn by three
federal court judges after the Legislature deadlocked in 2001. The judges made few
changes, allowing 17 Democrats to retain their seats in November's election. So in
Texas, where every statewide office is held by a Republican, Democrats hold a twoseat majority in Congress. DeLay has been pressing the Legislature to revisit the issue. "All over this country, courts are drawing the districts," DeLay said. "That is
unconstitutional in my eyes, and you have to stop it by standing up and accepting your
responsibility as called for by the Constitution." Id.
27. See Guillermo X. Garcia, New CongressionalMap Would Beef up the GOP; Measure Due in House Would Affect Rodriguez, SAN ATroNio EXr'RESs-NEws, May 7, 2003, at
9A (explaining that the House redistricting hearings were drawn out and contentious, with
committee members clashing with the committee's chairman "on a number of issues").
28. See id.
Rep. Richard Raymond... fought with Crabb over the chairman's handling of public
hearings. Raymond said holding hearings outside of Austin is vital, especially in areas
with large minority populations, and said he planned to file a complaint with the U.S.
Justice Department, alleging Crabb violated federal law. Crabb has said there's not
enough time to hold those meetings and denied that he was discriminating against
Hispanic voters. Id.
29. Editorial, No Reason Other than Petty Vindictiveness for Redistricting, AUSTIN
AM.-STATESMAN, May 8, 2003, at A18 (editorializing its criticism of Chairman Joe Crabb
for the manner in which he approached public hearings on the redistricting issue).

30. See Texas Redistricting 2000-2006 News Items, http://www.tlc.state.tx.us/redist/
doc/00-03redistnews.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2007) ("May 6, 2003-The House Committee
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gressional districts in Texas. The redistricting map that was reported out
of committee was designed to increase the number of Republican districts
by five to seven seats while protecting all fifteen Republican incumbents. 31 Democrats said the map weakened minority voting strength because it packed minority voting blocs into existing minority districts and
split other minority blocs into existing minority districts.32
After the redistricting bill was introduced, it was on the fast-track for
passage in the Republican-controlled House.33 Democrats understood
that the only way to stop the map from passing was to prevent a vote on
the bill, and wait for the legislative session to expire.
With exceptional stealth, more than fifty House Democrats quietly
slipped out of Texas under cover of darkness on May 11, 2003. 3 ' The
Democrats' disappearance deprived the 150-seat House of a quorum.
Without the requisite number of legislators present, the House was effectively shut down and no votes could be called.35
The Democrats checked-in at the Holiday Inn of Ardmore, Oklahoma,
where Texas law enforcement officers had no jurisdiction to arrest them
under the governor's order.3 6 Their whereabouts unknown, several of
the missing Democrats released a statement on May 12th as their absence

on Redistricting approves a committee substitute... for H.B. 3398, relating to the composition of the districts for the election of members of the U.S. House of Representatives
from Texas.").
31. See Lee Hockstader, GOP Plan Prompts a Texas Exodus; Democrats Stall State
Legislature's Redistricting Vote, WASH. POST, May 13, 2003, at A01 (reporting about the
political goals that the Republican redistricting map was designed to achieve).
32. See Guillermo X. Garcia, New CongressionalMap Would Beef up the GOP; Measure Due in House Would Affect Rodriguez, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, May 7, 2003, at
9A (noting that Democrats in the Texas Legislature objected to the proposed map because
of its manipulation of minority voting communities in various parts of the state).
33. See Lou DUBOSE & JAN REID, THE HAMMER: TOM DELAY, GOD, MONEY, AND
THE RISE OF THE REPUBLICAN CONGRESS 210 (2004) ("The redistricting plan voted out of

the committee was hurtling toward passage like a runaway train.").
34. See Lee Hockstader, GOP Plan Prompts a Texas Exodus; Democrats Stall State
Legislature's Redistricting Vote, WASH. POST, May 13, 2003, at A01 ("Moving with ...
tactical coordination, more than [fifty] Democratic state lawmakers in Texas packed their
bags and quietly slipped out of the state ... late Sunday and early [Monday].").
35. See id. (explaining that the walkout deprived the Texas House of a quorum and
basically shut down its ability to legislate because 100 members must be present for the
150-member House to conduct business).
36. See Carolyn Barta, Legislature 2003: Fiscal Restraint and Partisanship,in TEXAS
ALMANAC 398 (Elizabeth Cruce Alvarez ed., 2004) (discussing the Demcocrats' destination and the reasons why they chose the small town of Ardmore, Oklahoma).
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became conspicuous in Austin: "We won't be present today-or any
37
day-that the House plans to consider this outrageous partisan action."
Gov. Perry ordered state troopers to track down the Democrats and
haul them back to Austin.3 8 State troopers interrogated nurses in a hospital where a missing Democrat's wife had just given birth.3 9 In El Paso,
troopers were inside another legislator's home without a warrant questioning a seventeen-year-old girl regarding her father's whereabouts.4n
Four days after arriving in Ardmore, the Democrats returned to Texas
with a small victory. On May 15, Speaker Craddick adjourned the House
of Representatives regular legislative session and the redistricting bill was
effectively dead as a result.4 1
On June 18, Gov. Perry ordered the Texas Legislature to convene in a
special session, for the first time in over a decade, to redraw the state's
congressional districts.4 " Republicans praised the governor for calling the
special session, while Democrats criticized him for a legislative session
that would cost $1.7 million to pursue a purely partisan issue.4 3 Gov.
Perry indicated that funding for medical schools in the Lower Rio
Grande Valley and El Paso may be added to the special session agenda if
redistricting passes, but Democrats accused the governor of using funding
for medical schools in Latino communities as blackmail to buy the redistricting votes of Latino lawmakers.4 4

37. Lee Hockstader, GOP Plan Prompts a Texas Exodus; Democrats Stall State Legislature's Redistricting Vote, WASH. POST, May 13, 2003, at A01 (highlighting the alleged

principles for the Democrats' quorum-breaking journey to Oklahoma).
38. See Lou DUBOSE & JAN REID, THE HAMMER: TOM DELAY, GOD, MONEY, AND
THE RISE OF THE REPUBLICAN CONGRESS 211 (2004) ("[Gov. Perry] ordered troopers to

find the fugitives, arrest them, and haul them back.").
39. See id. ("On reported orders of [Gov.] Perry, troopers harangued nurses in a neonatal hospital ward in Galveston where a House member's wife had given birth to premature twins.").
40. Id.
41. See Dave Harmon & Laylan Copelin, Back in Texas, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN,
May 16, 2003, at Al (reporting that the regular legislative session expired without the
Texas Legislature passing a redistricting bill due to a lack of a quorum).
42. See R.G. Ratcliffe & Clay Robison, New Battle Brews over Redistricting; Perry
Calls Special Session; White House Lobbies, Hous. CHRON., June 19, 2003, at Al (reporting that a special session was called for the purpose of passing a redistricting bill and noting
that the calling of a special session is an extraordinary event in Texas government).
43. See id. (reporting the expenses billed to taxpayers as a result of the special session
and noting the partisan rancor surrounding the session).
44. See id. (describing lucrative political deals offered to some Democrats as a means
of securing their vote in favor of a Republican redistricting map).
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Democrats counted on their colleagues in the Senate to block the redistricting map in the special session.4 5 Democrats held eleven of the thirtyone seats in the Texas Senate, but a traditional rule required two-thirds of
the Senate to agree to take up any bill."6 Without at least some Democratic consent, Republicans were barred from introducing legislation, including a redistricting bill. On July 25th, Lt. Gov. David Dewhurst, a
Republican, informed reporters that the redistricting plan did not have
sufficient support in the Senate to pass during the special session."7 Democrats once again prevailed on a procedural technicality, but the Republicans persisted.
When the special session expired on July 28th, Gov. Perry immediately
called a second session."8 Lt. Gov. Dewhurst, as presiding officer of the
Senate, abolished the longstanding two-thirds tradition to allow the redistricting bill to come up for a vote without the consent of the Democrats."9
Without the two-thirds rule, Senate Democrats decided to prevent the
two-thirds quorum, and fled from Texas just before the second special
session gaveled into order.5 ° The purpose of the exodus was the same as
the House Democrats' four-day trip to Oklahoma two months earlier.
Senate Democrats embedded themselves in Albuquerque, New Mexico,
and stayed there for the duration of the month-long second special session. 5 While the Senate Democrats were in exile, Republican leaders in
Austin agreed to fine each absentee senator $5000 per day, and revoke
parking, printing, and mail privileges for their staffers in the Capitol.52
45. See id. (noting that the Senate's rules provided a useful weapon for the Democrats
to block a redistricting bill).
46. See Democrats Derail Texas GOP Plan For House Seats; Redistricting Bill Has
White House Support, But Not Enough Votes, WASH. POST, July 26, 2003, at A03 (discussing the Senate tradition of not introducing legislation unless two-thirds of the senators vote
to consider the bill or resolution).
47. See id. (reporting that the Senate's traditional "two-thirds" rule had not been invoked regarding the redistricting bill).
48. See Another Try at Redistricting, Another Trip for Democrats, AUSTIN AM.STATESMAN, July 29, 2003, at A8 (reporting that after the first special session was unsuccessful in passing a redistricting bill, Gov. Perry called a second special session to pass the
redistricting bill).
49. See id. (reporting that Lt. Gov. Dewhurst abolished the "two-thirds" rule to force
the redistricting bill onto the floor against the will of a substantial number of senators).
50. See id. (reporting that Senate Democrats fled to New Mexico to prevent a quorum
in the Senate to preclude the chamber from voting on the redistricting bill).
51. See Edward Walsh, Texas Legislature Adjourns Special Session; Governor to Call
Members Back a 3rd Time to Force Vote on GOP Redistricting Plan, WASH. POST, Aug. 27,
2003, at A04 (discussing the Senate Democrats' exile in Albuquerque, New Mexico).
52. See Peggy Fikac, Demos' Office Privileges Stripped; Republican Senators Vote to
Cut Off their AWOL Colleagues Unless Fines Paid, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Aug. 16,

2003, at 1B (discussing Republican leadership's plans to levy fines against absentee senators and their staffers).
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An editorial in the Austin American-Statesman said that punishing the
Democrats in that manner underscored the entire redistricting saga:
Partisanship-and not racism-likely motivated Republican senators
to levy fines against their absent Democratic colleagues ....

But

there is no doubt that those actions are having racial effects. The
fines in particular levied last week by 17 white senators on 11 senators-nine of whom are Latino or African American-

. . . have

drawn comparisons to poll taxes once imposed to thwart African
Americans and Hispanics from voting .

.

.

. In the latest move

Republicans... are raising ghosts of Texas' racial past. It began with
their vote to fine the group of largely minority senators up to $57,000
each if they did not end their boycott and return to the Senate ....
Democrats
have charged that the fines symbolically amount to a poll
53
tax.
The Texas Legislature adjourned on August 26th unable to bring the
redistricting bill up for a vote. 5" Democratic leader Sen. Leticia Van de
Putte, said after the session expired, "[u]ntil [Gov.] Perry decides to listen
to the people of the state of Texas instead of taking orders from Washington, D.C., partisans, we will remain firm in protecting our constituents."5 5
On September 9th, Gov. Perry called an extraordinary third special
session of the Texas Legislature for the purpose of passing a redistricting
bill. 56 One of the Democratic hold-outs returned to the Capitol and gave
the Senate a quorum,5 7 and the remaining Senate Democrats followed
suit.58 After over a month of debate in both chambers of the Legislature,
Gov. Perry signed the redistricting bill on October 13th.5 9

53. Alberta Phillips, Editorial, Regardless of Intent, Senate Fines Raise Specter of Racism, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Aug. 17, 2003, at E3 (editorializing the hostile undercurrent of the Senate showdown).
54. See Edward Walsh, Texas Legislature Adjourns Special Session; Governor to Call
Members Back a 3rd Time to Force Vote on GOP Redistricting Plan,WASH. POST, Aug. 27,
2003, at A04 (reporting that the second special session also expired without passing the
Republicans' redistricting bill).
55. Id. (quoting Sen. Leticia Van de Putte).
56. See Lee Hockstader, Texas Governor Orders Session; Legislature to Take up Redistricting as Democrats Return, WASH. POST, Sept. 10, 2003, at A02 (reporting that Gov.
Perry called a third special session of the Texas Legislature to pass a redistricting bill).
57. See id. (reporting that one of the Democrats-in-exile returned to Austin and provided the Texas Senate with the quorum necessary to take up redistricting legislation).
58. Id.
59. See Pete Slover, Governor Signs Redistricting Bill; Dispute over Whether it Hurts
Minority Power Will Go to Court Next, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 14, 2003, at 5A

(reporting that the Republican redistricting bill was signed into law on October 13, 2003).
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B.

The Aftermath' A Tale of Two Districts

The new congressional districts had their desired effect after they were
put into place for the 2004 elections for the U.S. House of Representatives. The candidate (Democrats and Republicans both) preferred by minority voters won in only fifteen of the thirty-two congressional races.
Conversely, the previous districts that were in place for during the 2002
elections sent the minority-preferred candidate (Democrats and Republicans both) to Washington in twenty-one of the Texas congressional
districts.6 °
The negative impact of the new redistricting map on the rights of minorities in Texas is most vivid in two districts: Congressional District 23
(CD23) Congressional District 24 (CD24), which will accordingly be the
focus of this comment.
1. Congressional District 23
CD 23 is a geographically expansive area along the Rio Grande spanning from the extreme western part of Texas near El Paso to Laredo and
San Antonio. CD 23 is a predominantly rural district and contains many
small farming and ranching towns with substantial Latino populations.6 1
Before being redrawn, CD 23 included the whole of Laredo, a fast-growing border port of entry with a population of almost 200,000-94% of
whom are Latino.62

60. Rep. Tom DeLay's role in the 2003 Texas redistricting ultimately led to his resignation as House majority leader and as a member of Congress. See Carl Hulse, DeLay Is
Quitting Race and House, Officials Report, N.Y. TIMES, April 4, 2006, at Al ("Representative Tom DeLay, the relentless Texan who helped lead House Republicans to power but
became ensnared in a corruption scandal, has decided to leave Congress"). "Mr. DeLay is
under indictment in Texas on campaign-finance related charges for his role in a state redistricting plan that gained Republican House seats in the state but focused national scrutiny
on his political tactics. The indictment forced him to step aside from his leadership post,
but he had intended to [run for re-election] if he beat the charges." Id. "DeLay was
indicted last September in Texas on unrelated charges involving violations of state election
laws including money laundering and conspiring to funnel illegal corporate contributions
to Republican statehouse candidates in 2002. The charges were later scaled back by a state
judge to the money-laundering counts and remain the subject of an appeal." Id. See also
Jonathan Weisman, Effort to Secure Texas Led to Fall of Tom DeLay, WASH. POST, June
29, 2006, at A6 ("Tom DeLay's dogged quest for a new congressional map for Texas led to
a disciplinary slap from the House ethics committee, his indictment on money-laundering
charges, his fall from the House leadership ranks and, this month, his resignation from
Congress.").
61. See Brief for Appellants GI Forum of Texas at 6, League of United Latin Am.
Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594 (2006) (No. 05-439) (describing the 23rd congressional
district of Texas).
62. See id. (discussing the demographics of CD 23).
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During the 1990's, San Antonio Republican U.S. Rep. Henry Bonilla
represented CD 23 after being elected and re-elected with limited support from Latino voters. However, by the end of the 1990's, the district's
Latino voting-age population (VAP) rose from 46% to 58%.63 The
growth in the Latino population made CD 23 an opportunity for Latinos
to elect their candidate of choice. Latinos increasingly voted against Rep.
Bonilla, and he was almost defeated in 2002. Because Bonilla's re-election bid would be threatened even more in 2004, the Legislature severed
Laredo in half and moved 100,000 members of the cohesive Latino community into another congressional district that was already a safe harbor
for Latino voters.6 4 As a result, the Latino voters left behind in CD 23
had virtually no opportunity to elect the candidate of their choice. The
Latino extraction from CD 23 undermined years of progress made by a
Latino community that has been victimized by voting-related discrimination in the past. "Against this background, the Latinos' diminishing electoral support for Bonilla indicates their belief he was 'unresponsive to the
particularized needs of a minority group.' In essence the State took away
'
the Latinos' opportunity because Latinos were about to exercise it. "65
2. Congressional District 24
CD 24 is an urban district that is based in the Dallas-Fort Worth Metroplex. Prior to redistricting, CD 24 was a district that presented an opportunity for black voters to elect the candidate of their choice.6 6 In the
2000 and 2002 elections, African-Americans represented 68% of the voters in the CD 24 Democratic primary, and the winner of the Democratic
primary typically had an excellent opportunity to win the general election
with significant support from both black and Latino voters.6 7 In every
election from 1978 through 2002, voters in CD 24 elected Arlington Democrat U.S. Rep. Martin Frost to Congress. Rep. Frost was a bitter political enemy of Rep. Tom DeLay, and Frost's ouster was deemed a priority
in the redistricting process. In fact, one of the proposed redistricting
maps that redrew CD 24 was withdrawn by one Republican because of
concerns that it would violate the Voting Rights Act by diluting the
strength of minority voters because it was imperative to eliminate Frost
63. Id.
64. See Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. at 2621 (illustrating the severance of the Latino
community into another congressional district).
65. Id. at 2622.
66. Allan J. Lichtman, Report of Allan J. Lichtman on Voting-Rights Issues in Texas
Congressional Redistricting 23 (Nov. 14, 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author).
67. Id. at 24 (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). Lichtman's manuscript
details the impact redistricting can have on minority communities and candidates. Id.
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by any means necessary. However, those concerns were ultimately swept
aside. The means employed to dismantle CD 24 were simple. Black voters were splintered into five other districts represented by white Republicans. 68 The ratio of whites to blacks among the voting age population in
the five districts ranged from 4.6:1 to 12.3:1, thus allowing white Republican members of Congress to be indifferent to the needs of their minority
constituents who were previously well-represented in Congress before
their voice was silenced by redistricting.6 9
C.

Equal Protection & the Voting Rights Act of 1965

The Voting Rights Act of 1965 was signed into law by President Lyndon Johnson during the peak of the Civil Rights Movement in the United
States. The Voting Rights Act enhances the Fourteenth Amendment by
specifying which state laws "abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens," and the Act also enforces the equal protection of the voting laws of
the several states.70
71
The United States Supreme Court's 1964 decision in Reynolds v. Sims
was a watershed case in addressing the rights of voters amid gerrymandering of legislative districts. The Reynolds Court held that the Constitution protects the right to vote in federal and state elections for all
68. See Brief for the Texas State-Area Conference of the NAACP as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Appellants at 9, League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594
(2006) (No. 05-276) ("[T]he African-American voters who had sent Representative Frost
to Congress found themselves splintered among five different districts ....").
69. See id. at 9-10 (explaining that the five different districts were "represented by
Anglo Republicans whose districts were drawn such that they could afford to be indifferent
to their new minority constituents. The ratio of Anglos... to blacks ...in the five districts
range[d] from 4.6:1 and 12.3:1").
70. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2000) (explaining, in part, the policy basis for the Voting
Rights Act). A pertinent portion of the Voting Rights Act reads as follows:
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner
which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States
to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in
... this title, as provided in subsection (b) of this section.
(b) A violation of subsection (a) of this section is established if, based on the totality
of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) of this section in that its members
have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice. The extents to which members
of a protected class have been elected to office in the State or political subdivision is
one circumstance which may be considered: Provided, that nothing in this section establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to
their proportion in the population. Id.
71. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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qualified citizens.72 The Court added that a state can deny voting rights
by diluting the power of a citizen's vote in a manner that is just as effective as prohibiting the practice entirely.7 3 Speaking to the level of scrutiny that redistricting requires, the Reynolds Court held:
Undoubtedly, the right of suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free
and democratic society. Especially since the right to exercise the
franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other
basic civil and political rights, any alleged infringement of the right
74
of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized.
D. Equal Protection & Freedom of Speech
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides: "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States .... Nor deny to
75
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.",
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution grants, among
other rights, the freedom of speech: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof;
or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. "76
The First Amendment, like the U.S. Constitution itself, reflects both an
inherent and intentional commitment to democracy. The First Amendment places the citizens of the American democracy at its core. "The
textual rhythm of Madison's First Amendment reprises the life cycle of a
democratic idea, moving from the interior recesses of the human spirit to
individual expression, public discussion, collective action, and finally direct interaction with government., 77 Political participation and the dem72. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 554 (1964) (explaining the constitutional importance of the right to vote).
73. See id. at 555 (explaining the danger and the potential risks involved with the
dilution of voting power).
74. See id. at 561-62 (insisting that voting rights are fundamental rights under the rule
of law in America, and that attempts to modify the fundamental right to vote will trigger
strict scrutiny under constitutional jurisprudence).
75. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (setting forth the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
76. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
77. Brief for the Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Appellants at 21, League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 126 S.Ct. 2594
(2006) (No. 05-276) (describing how James Madison envisioned the First Amendment as
the protection of political activity among citizens as a means of protecting a democratic
form of governance).
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ocratic election of officials is therefore the First Amendment's core
purpose.
The United States Supreme Court held in Anderson v. Celebrezze that
the act of voting and the participation in the political process are as important as exercises of free speech. 78 First Amendment issues materialized when Texas gerrymandered congressional districts in such a way that
burdened a group of voters' political and representational rights.7 9
E. Litigation: Texas Voters v. the 2003 Texas Redistricting Plan
After the redistricted congressional map became the law of Texas, individual voters, public officeholders, minority interest groups, and civil
rights organizations filed suits in the United States Court for the Eastern
District of Texas. These suits asked the federal court to reinstate the 2001
congressional district boundaries and invalidate the 2003 redistricting
plan on the grounds that the gerrymandered congressional districts violate the Equal Protection Clause, the First Amendment, Article I of the
United States Constitution, and the Voting Rights Act.
The cases were consolidated into Session v. Perry, and the expedited
trial began in December 2003. On January 6, 2004, the Eastern District
Court handed down a divided opinion that upheld the 2003 redistricting
plan. The decision in Session v. Perry8 ° was vacated by the United States
Supreme Court, and was remanded to the district court with instructions
the light of the Supreme
that the consolidated cases be considered 8in
2
8
Court's recent decision, ' Vieth v. Jubelirer.
In its second opinion, the district court again upheld the 2003 redistricting plan, and an appeal to the United States Supreme Court ensued. On
March 1, 2006, the United States Supreme Court heard arguments in
League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, and the case was decided on June 28, 2006."3

78. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 787 (1983) (equating voting and political
participation to the exercise of the freedom of speech).
79. See Brief for the Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Appellants at 22, League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 126 S.
Ct. 2594 (2006) (No. 05-276) ("In the context of partisan gerrymandering... First Amendment concerns arise where an apportionment has the purpose and effect of burdening a
group of voters' representational rights.").
80. 298 F. Supp. 2d 451 (E.D. Tex. 2004) (per curiam).
81. Henderson v. Perry, 543 U.S. 941 (2004).
82. 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
83. See Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. at 2626 (rejecting "the statewide challenge to
Texas' redistricting as an unconstitutional political gerrymander and the challenge to the
redistricting of the Dallas area as a violation of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act[,]" but holding
"that redrawing the lines in District 23 violates § 2 of the Voting Rights Act").
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LEGAL ANALYSIS

Roles of Branches of Government in Congressional Redistricting

When the Court heard the arguments in League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry (hereinafter LULAC), it was mindful of the different
roles played by different sectors of the government in arranging congressional districts. The United States Constitution delegates the apportionment of congressional districts primarily to state legislatures.'
Article I of the Constitution provides in Section 2 that "[t]he House of
Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second
Year by the People of the several States."8 5 Section 4 delegates that
"[tlhe Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for... Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the
Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations .... 86
Notwithstanding the Constitution's broad delegation of congressional
apportionment to the legislative branch, the judiciary plays an important
role when a legislature's congressional redistricting plan violates the
Constitution.8 7
Legislative bodies should not leave their reapportionment tasks to
the federal courts; but when those with legislative responsibilities do
not respond, or the imminence of a state election makes it impractical for them to do so, it becomes the 'unwelcome obligation' of the
federal court to devise and impose a reapportionment plan pending
later legislative action.88
The LULAC Court recognized the precedents that provided an underlying assumption for the federal courts to prefer a congressional redistricting plan drawn by a state legislature, but held those lawmaking
bodies should not abuse the assumed separation of powers to rely on improper criteria in the redistricting process.89

84. See Growe v. Emison, 113 S. Ct. 1075, 1081 (1993) (explaining that the text of
Article I "leaves with the States the primary responsibility for apportionment of their federal congressional . . . districts"); see also Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 27 (1975)
("[R]eapportionment is primarily the duty and responsibility of the State through its

legislature.").
85. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (organizing the structure and composition of the U.S.
House of Representatives).
86. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (delegating certain responsibilities to state governments regarding the assembling of a national Congress).
87. See, e.g., Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 6 (1964) (stating that the right to vote is
too important to be stripped of judicial review).
88. Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 535, 540 (1978).
89. See Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. at 2609 ("Judicial respect for legislative plans ...
cannot justify legislative reliance on improper criteria for districting determination.").
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B.

L ULAC PartL Constitutionalityof Mid-decade Partisan
Redistricting

The Court recognized the appellant voters first claim as a request to
declare the 2003 redistricting plan unconstitutional. The voters, represented by LULAC, contended that a mid-decade redistricting battle with
purely partisan motives violates the First Amendment and equal protection because: 1) it burdens certain citizens on account of their political
views;and, 2) because it does not serve any legitimate public purpose.9"
The State disputed the argument that the Texas Legislature's 2003 redistricting plan was motivated exclusively by partisan gain for
Republicans. 9 1
The Court was not convinced by the appellant-voters' initial theory.
"The sole-intent standard offered here is no more compelling when it is
linked to the circumstance that [the new redistricting plan] is mid-decennial legislation. The text and structure of the Constitution and our case
law indicate there is nothing inherently suspect
about a legislature's deci92
districts]."
congressional
sion to [redraw
The appellant-voters noted that the map was drawn in 2003 based on
census data that was gathered in 2000. Because of shifts in the population
of Texas during those three years, the voters contended that the 2003 redistricting plan "created unlawful interdistrict population variances, 93
and that those discrepancies are repugnant to the one person, one vote
doctrine. The appellant-voters relied on the Karcher holding, which
states that variances in congressional districts are permissible only if they
"are unavoidable despite a good-faith effort to achieve absolute equality,
or for which justification is shown." 94

90. See id.
91. See id.

[T]he state appellees dispute the assertion that partisan gain was the 'sole' motivation
for the decision to replace Plan 1151C. There is some merit to that criticism, for the
pejorative label overlooks indications that partisan motives did not dictate the plan in
its entirety. The legislature does seem to have decided to redistrict with the sole pur-

pose of achieving a Republican congressional majority, but partisan aims did not guide
every line it drew. As the District Court found, the contours of some contested district lines were drawn based on more mundane and local interests. Id.
92. Id. at 2610.
93. Id. (explaining the negative impact of stale U.S. Census Bureau data in the redistricting process).
94. Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 729 (1983) (discussing population variances

among representative districts).
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Ultimately, the Court held that absolute equal apportionment is a legal
fiction,9 5 and the Court rejected the appellant-voters' two theories asserting that mid-decade, partisan redistricting is unconstitutional. 96
C. CongressionalRedistricting & Voting Rights Act Jurisprudence
A state redistricting plan violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act if:
based on the totality of the circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of
[a racial minority group] in that its members have less opportunity
than other members of the electorate to participate in the political
process and to elect representatives of their choice. 97
In Thornburgv. Gingles, the Supreme Court identified three conditions
for establishing a violation of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act. 98 The three
"Gingles requirements" are: 1) the existence of a large and compact minority racial group that constitutes a majority in the congressional district;
2) that is politically cohesive; and, 3) one in which White voters usually
vote in a bloc "to defeat the minority group's preferred candidate." 99
If all three of the Gingles requirements are met, then the Voting Rights
Act directs the courts to consider the totality of the circumstances in deciding whether members of a racial group have a diminished opportunity
compared to other voters. 0 0 The "totality of the circumstances" in Voting Rights Act jurisprudence has been identified as including:
[T]he history of voting-related discrimination in the State or political
subdivision; the extent to which voting . . . is racially polarized; the
extent to which the State ...has used voting practices or procedures
that tend to enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the
95. See Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. at 2610 ("States operate under the legal fiction that
their plans are constitutionally apportioned throughout the decade, a presumption that is
necessary to avoid constant redistricting, with accompanying costs and instability.").
96. See id. at 2612.
In sum, we disagree with appellants' view that a legislature's decision to override a
valid, court-drawn plan mid-decade is sufficiently suspect to give shape to a reliable
standard for identifying unconstitutional political gerrymanders. We conclude that appellants have established no legally impermissible use of political classifications. For
this reason, they state no claim on which relief may be granted for their statewide
challenge. Id.
97. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2000).
98. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986) (setting out the Gingles requirements for identifying violations of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act).
99. See Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1006-1007 (1994) (quoting Growe v.
Emison, 507 U.S. 25 (1993) (quoting Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986))).
100. See Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 91 (1997).
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minority group... ; the extent to which minority group members
bear the effects of past discrimination in areas such as education,
employment, and health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political process; the use of overt or subtle racial appeals in political campaigns; and the extent to which members of the
minority group have been elected to public office in the jurisdiction
.... [E]vidence demonstrating that elected officials are unresponsive to the particularized needs of the members of the minority
group and that the policy underlying the State's ...use of the contested practice or structure is tenuous may have probative value. 10 1
D. LULAC Part II: CongressionalDistrict 23, the Voting Rights Act &
Equal Protection
The second question addressed by the LULAC Court was whether the
2003 redistricting plan violates § 2 of the Voting Rights Act in regard to
the 23rd congressional district, represented by Henry Bonilla. The appellant voters argue that the redrawing of CD 23 diluted voting rights in the
Latino community that was not partitioned off by the new map.1 °2 Specifically, redistricting CD 23 resulted in a drop
from 57.5% to 46% in the
10 3
population.
voting-age
the
of
share
Latino
To determine whether the reduction amounted to vote dilution in the
Latino electorate, the Court employed the Gingles analysis. "[I]t is evident that the second and third Gingles preconditions-cohesion among
the minority group and bloc voting among the majority population-are
present in District 23. The District Court found 'racially polarized voting'
in south and west Texas, and indeed 'throughout the State.' ,O Polarization in CD 23 was stark. In 2002, "92% of Latinos voted against Bonilla,"
while the congressman simultaneously received 88% of the non-Latino
vote. 10 5 It was further projected that Anglo voters would typically vote
in
10 6
a bloc to prevent Latinos from electing their preferred candidate.

101. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 44-45 (quoting S. REP. No. 97-417 (1982)).
102. See Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. at 2614-15 ("Appellants argue that the changes to
District 23 diluted the voting rights of Latinos who remain in the district.").
103. See id. at 2615 (recognizing that the redistricting plan unquestionably weakens
Latino voting strength in the district).
104. Id. (discussing the District Court's finding of polarized voting in different regions
of Texas).
105. See id. (indicating the polarization along racial lines of the votes for and the votes
against Rep. Bonilla in CD 23).
106. See id. ("[T]he projected results in new District 23 show that the Anglo citizen
voting-age majority will often, if not always, prevent Latinos from electing the candidate of
their choice in the district.").
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The first Gingles condition requires a racial group to be "sufficiently
large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a [congressional] district., 10 7 The Court held that Latinos in CD 23 constituted a
majority under the old plan, and that the district provided precisely the
type of
electoral opportunity protected by § 2 of the Voting Rights
08
1

Act.

The Court was satisfied that appellant-voters established that CD 23
was clearly a Latino opportunity district under the previous plan, and that
redistricting took that opportunity away. 0 9
The State conceded that CD 23 satisfied the Gingles requirements, but
argued that § 2 was not violated because the 2003 redistricting plan offset
CD 23 with another Latino opportunity district in a different part of the
State when it created CD 25.110
The Court agreed that states are given a great deal of leeway in drawing congressional districts and complying with the Voting Rights Act, but
the Court rejected the State's premise that redistricting can take away
opportunity from certain individuals by giving a greater opportunity to
others.111 Furthermore, CD 25 was not an "offset" for the former CD 23,
107. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50 (discussing the first Gingles requirement).
108. See Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. at 2615.
For all these reasons, appellants demonstrated sufficient minority cohesion and majority bloc voting to meet the second and third Gingles requirements. The first Gingles
factor requires that a group be "sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district." Latinos in District 23 could have constituted a majority of the citizen voting-age population in the district, and in fact did so
under Plan 1151C. Though it may be possible for a citizen voting-age majority to lack
real electoral opportunity, the Latino majority in old District 23 did possess electoral
opportunity protected by § 2. Id.
109. See id. at 2616.
Plan 1374C's version of District 23, by contrast, "is unquestionably not a Latino opportunity district." Latinos, to be sure, are a bare majority of the voting-age population in new District 23, but only in a hollow sense, for the parties agree that the
relevant numbers must include citizenship. This approach fits the language of § 2 because only eligible voters affect a group's opportunity to elect candidates. In sum,
appellants have established that Latinos could have had an opportunity district in District 23 had its lines not been altered and that they do not have one now. Id.
110. See id. ("The State argues ...that it met its § 2 obligations by creating new
District 25 as an offsetting opportunity district. It is true, of course, that 'States retain
broad discretion in drawing districts to comply with the mandate of § 2."' (quoting Shaw v.
Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 917, n. 9 (1996))).
111. See id.
This principle has limits, though. The Court has rejected the premise that a State can
always make up for the less-than-equal opportunity of some individuals by providing
greater opportunity to others ....These conflicting concerns are resolved by allowing
the State to use one majority-minority district to compensate for the absence of another only when the racial group in each area had a § 2 right and both could not be
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and it could hardly be considered a Latino opportunity district. The
newly-drawn CD 25 linked disparate Latino enclaves in a very narrow
district that stretches over 300 miles from Austin in the north through
rural areas down the to the Lower Rio Grande Valley in the south. The
Latinos in the old CD 23 were a community that voted together in a cohesive way. The Latinos in the new CD 25 are associated only by their
race and are too far away from one another to seize any opportunity that
might be available to them under the 2003 redistricting plan.
Satisfied that the appellant-voters proved all three Gingles requirements regarding CD 23, and that CD 25 did not present an adequate remedy to the dilution of CD 23, the Court assessed the "totality of the
circumstances" to complete its analysis of the Voting Rights Act claim.
The district court recognized "the long history of discrimination against
Latinos and Blacks in Texas.", 112 Other courts have recognized the troublesome aspect of Texas history.
Texas has a long, well-documented history of discrimination that has
touched upon the rights of African-Americans and Hispanics to register, to vote, or to participate otherwise in the electoral process.
Devices such as the poll tax, an all-white primary system, and restrictive voter registration time periods are an unfortunate part of this
State's minority voting rights history. The history of official discrimination in the Texas election process-stretching back to Reconstruction-led to the inclusion of the State as a covered jurisdiction under
Section 5 in the 1975 amendments to the Voting Rights Act.1 13
Latino voters in CD 23 were becoming increasingly active in voting and
politics. In successive elections, the Latino community voted against U.S.
Rep. Bonilla. In response to the threat to Bonilla's incumbency, the
Texas Legislature divided the cohesive Laredo Latino community in the
2003 redistricting map. The shift of 100,000 Latinos out of the district left
the remaining Latinos with almost no opportunity to elect the candidate
of their choice. The 2003 redistricting plan undermined the years of progress that Latinos had made in overcoming voter-related discrimination
and adversity.

accommodated. As to the first Gingles requirement, it is not enough that appellants
show the possibility of creating a majority-minority district that would include the Latinos in District 23. Id.
112. Session v. Perry (Session), 298 F. Supp. 2d 451, 473 (2004) (discussing the often
racially discriminatory nature of Texas history).
113. Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 981-82 (1996) (recognizing racial and ethnic discrimination in Texas history, primarily the discriminatory tactics used to suppress the voting
power of minorities in Texas).
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The essence of the assessment of the totality of the circumstances
showed that "the State took away the Latinos' opportunity because Latinos were about to exercise it.""' 4 The Court held that the situation
caused in CD 23 by the Texas Legislature's 2003 redistricting plan demonstrated a violation of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act, under the "totality of
the circumstances."
Because the Court held that the redrawing of CD 23 in: the 2004 redistricting plan violated § 2 of the Voting Rights Act, the Court ordered that
congressional districts in South and West Texas must be revised to remedy the voting rights violation." 5 However, because some of the congressional districts would have to be redrawn, the Court declined to
confront the Texas voters' claims of First Amendment and equal protection violations, since those complaints had the possibility of becoming
moot after the Court-ordered redrawing.
E. LULAC Part III: CongressionalDistrict 24, the Voting Rights Act
The appellant-voters similarly challenged the changes made to CD 24
during the 2003 redistricting battle. An African-American stronghold
was simply partitioned out of existence in a classic case of divide-andconquer. Specifically, the voters contended that African-Americans had
an opportunity to elect the candidate of their choice in CD 24 under the
pre-2003 maps in the Dallas-Fort Worth area, and that dismantling CD
24 diluted the strength of the African-American vote and violated § 2 of
the Voting Rights Act.' 1 6

114. Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. at 2622 (quoting the opinion of the Court).
115. See id. at 2623.
Based on the foregoing, the totality of the circumstances demonstrates a § 2 violation.
Even assuming Plan 1374C provides something close to proportional representation
for Latinos, its troubling blend of politics and race-and the resulting vote dilution of
a group that was beginning to achieve § 2's goal of overcoming prior electoral discrimination-cannot be sustained ....The districts in south and west Texas will have to be
redrawn to remedy the violation in District 23, and we have no cause to pass on the
legitimacy of a district that must be changed .... District 25, in particular, was formed
to compensate for the loss of District 23 as a Latino opportunity district, and there is
no reason to believe District 25 will remain in its current form once District 23 is
brought into compliance with § 2. We therefore vacate the District Court's judgment
as to these claims. Id.
116. See id. at 2624 ("Appellants also challenge the changes to district lines in the
Dallas area, alleging they dilute African-American voting strength in violation of § 2 of the
Voting Rights Act. Specifically, appellants contend that an African-American minority effectively controlled District 24 under Plan 1151C, and that § 2 entitles them to this
district.").
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Whites were the single largest racial group in CD 24 prior to the 2003
redistricting and comprised 49.8% of the voting-age population. 1 7 African-Americans comprised 25.7% while Latinos made up 20.8%.118 The
Court accepted that it is possible for a racial group to state a claim under
§ 2 of the Voting Rights Act even though it makes up less than half of the
voting-age population.) 9
The relatively small African-American community in former CD 24
could constitute a sufficiently large minority to elect the candidate of
their choice because 64% of the voters in the Democratic primary were
African-American. 120 The appellant-voters argued that because a substantial number of Latinos and Anglos voted for the Democratic candidate in the general election, African-American control of the Democratic
1 21
primary was equated to effective control of the general election.
The District Court found that African-Americans could not elect the
candidate of their choice 122 because CD 24 consistently elected a white
Democrat, Martin Frost, to Congress. The Supreme Court then held that,
although African-Americans were an influential bloc of voters in former
CD 24, that influence was not sufficient to state a § 2 claim. 123 The op-

117. See id. (discussing the racial demographics of the congressional district).
118. See Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. at 2624.
119. See id.
Accepting that African-Americans would not be a majority of the single-member district they seek, and that African-Americans do not vote cohesively with Hispanics...
appellants nonetheless contend African-Americans had effective control of District
24. As the Court has done several times before, we assume for purposes of this litigation that it is possible to state a § 2 claim for a racial group that makes up less than
50% of the population. Id.
120. See id. (explaining the potent political power of African-Americans in CD 24's
Democratic primary).
121. See id.
The relatively small African-American population can meet this standard, according
to appellants, because they constituted 64% of the voters in the Democratic primary.
Since a significant number of Anglos and Latinos voted for the Democrat in the general election, the argument goes, African-American control of the primary translated
into effective control of the entire election. Id.
122. See Session, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 483-84 ("In short, that Anglo Democrats control
this district is the most rational conclusion.").
123. See Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. at 2624.
Appellants fail to demonstrate clear error in this finding. In the absence of any contested Democratic primary in District 24 over the last 20 years, no obvious benchmark
exists for deciding whether African-Americans could elect their candidate of choice.
The fact that African-Americans voted for Frost-in the primary and general elections-could signify he is their candidate of choice. Without a contested primary,
however, it could also be interpreted to show (assuming racial bloc voting) that Anglos and Latinos would vote in the Democratic primary in greater numbers if an Afri-
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portunity "to elect representatives of their choice" 12 the Court held, required more than influence over the outcome of the election when none
of the candidates running were a candidate of choice among AfricanAmericans. 125 However, the Court almost immediately negated its own
logic by noting: "There is no doubt that African-Americans preferred
Frost . .

.

.The fact that African-Americans preferred Frost to some

others does not, however, make him their candidate of choice. Accordingly, the ability to aid in Frost's election does not make the old District
'
24 an African-American opportunity district for the purposes of § 2. 126
F. The Rule of LULAC
1. Mid-decade redistricting of congressional districts does not inherently violate the Equal Protection Clause, the First Amendment, or the principle of "one person, one vote. ,127
2. The 2003 redistricting of the 23rd congressional district diluted
the votes of Latinos, in violation of128§ 2 of the Voting Rights Act,
and it was ordered to be redrawn.
3. The disintegration of a strong African-American voting community in the former 24th congressional
district did not violate § 2
1 29
of the Voting Rights Act.
The plurality decision in L ULAC was the final settlement of the law for
appellant-voters, and it was not an adequate remedy for the violation of
the rights of millions of Texas voters. The Court's holding appeared to be
very selective regarding the precedents and statutes it chose to apply in
the case. Indeed, the problems posed by redrawing congressional districts are beyond the scope of the plurality decision in LULAC.
can-American candidate of choice were to run, especially given Texas' open primary
system. Id.
124. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2000) (providing Voting Rights Act statutory language).
125. See Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. at 2625.
The opportunity "to elect representatives of their choice" ... requires more than the
ability to influence the outcome between some candidates, none of whom is their candidate of choice. There is no doubt African-Americans preferred Martin Frost to the
Republicans who opposed him. The fact that African-Americans preferred Frost to
some others does not, however, make him their candidate of choice. Accordingly, the
ability to aid in Frost's election does not make the old District 24 an African-American opportunity district for purposes of § 2. Id.
126. Id. (explaining why CD 24 was not an opportunity district for AfricanAmericans).
127. See generally Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594 (summarizing the Court's opinion).
128. See id.at 2601-02.
129. Id. at 2602.
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IV.

PROPOSAL

The remainder of this comment will propose three steps that federal
courts and the Texas Legislature should take to avoid the obvious pitfalls
that are inherent in mid-decade partisan redistricting episodes. Each step
will be discussed at length below. The first step would require congressional redistricting to serve a legitimate public interest. In the second
step, courts would apply a burden-shifting test in cases wherein the constitutionality of a particular congressional district is legitimately challenged. The third step would require the Texas Legislature to institute
comprehensive reforms to better guide itself through the process of redistricting while serving the interest of the citizens of Texas and protecting
the rights of Texas voters.
Step 1: Redistrictingto Serve a Legitimate Public Interest
The Supreme Court has previously held that the decision of a state
legislature to redraw congressional districts must, at least, fulfill a legitimate public interest. 130 The ongoing stability of congressional district
boundaries is important to voters and candidates alike. Redistricting
must be undertaken to reflect population changes and apportionment
based on the data released by the U.S. Census Bureau every ten years.
Congressional districts must also be redrawn if they are found to violate
the Voting Rights Act or the Constitution. However, the regular
campaigning, voting, and communication between representatives and
their constituents highlight the importance of maintaining stability in the
drawing of congressional boundaries. This stability should not be undermined for a purely partisan endeavor.
A purely partisan desire "to minimize or cancel out the voting strength
of racial or political elements of the voting population"1 3' 1 is not a legitimate purpose.
In his dissent in the LULAC case, Justice Stevens wrote that "a
straightforward application of settled constitutional law leads to the inescapable conclusion that the State may not decide to redistrict if its sole
motivation is 'to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or
political elements of the voting population."' 13 2

130. See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (holding that legislative bodies
of state governments should redraw congressional districts only in pursuit of a legitimate
public interest).
131. Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965) (explaining that pure partisanship in
pursuit of a political goal is not a legitimate public interest).
132. Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. at 2634 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Fortson v.
Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965)).
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The sole motivation, however, of the Texas Legislature for redrawing
the state's congressional districts in 2003 was the intent to minimize the
voting strength of Democratic voters in Texas.1 33 A plan devised for that
purpose should not withstand constitutional scrutiny.
The Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection component requires
action taken by the government to be supported by some legitimate interest-a desire to harm a politically disfavored group is no such interest.1 34
This constitutional protection underscores
the fundamental duty of the
135
government to govern impartially.
The Texas Legislature's decision to redraw congressional districts in
2003 was inconsistent with the constitutional principles in the First and
Fourteenth Amendments. "By taking an action for the sole purpose of
advantaging Republicans and disadvantaging Democrats, the State
of
136
Texas violated its constitutional obligation to govern impartially.,
Where, as in the case of Texas redistricting in 2003, a state legislature
redraws congressional districts for a purpose that does not fulfill a legitimate public purpose, it should not pass constitutional muster. A fortiori,
where a redistricting plan has a malicious partisan purpose and violates
the constitutional and voting rights of citizens, it would be even more
egregious for the Court to acquiesce to a mid-decade gerrymandered redistricting map.
Step 2: Application of a Burden-Shifting Test of Constitutionality
Justice Stevens recognized that state legislatures will perpetually be
aware of politics, and that the courts must tolerate politics to some degree
in the redistricting process. 37 However, it was also clear to Justice Stevens that "when a plaintiff can prove that a legislature's predominant motive in drawing a particular district was to disadvantage a politically
salient group, and that the decision has the
intended effect, the plaintiff's
1 38
constitutional rights have been violated.,
Based on Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion, this comment proposes a
burden-shifting test that courts should apply when the constitutionality of
133. See Session, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 470 (outlining the political motivation behind the
Texas Legislature's redistricting activity).
134. See Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 477 (1985) (explaining that harming a politically disfavored group serves no public interest, in and of itself,
and that doing so also raises questions regarding equal protection).
135. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 265 (1983) (promoting impartial governance
in the public interest).
136. Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. at 2634 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
137. See id. at 2641 (understanding that politics and political elements cannot be altogether eliminated, because they are inherent in the process to a limited degree).
138. Id. at 2642.
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particular redrawn congressional districts is called into question. The application of such a test would have avoided the inconsistent holding that
CD 23 was redrawn in an impermissible manner, but that CD 24 was
not-even though the redrawing of each seemed to violate the rights of
voters in nearly identical ways. The test would provide a manageable
remedy for blatant unconstitutional partisan gerrymanders.
First, in order to have standing, a plaintiff would have to be "either a
candidate or a voter" in the district that is being challenged.' 39 Second, a
plaintiff with proper standing would have to satisfy a two-pronged test
that proves that the redrawing of the congressional district had: 1) an
improper purpose; and, 2) an improper effect.' 4 °
Under the improper purpose prong, if the plaintiff proves that race was
the predominant motivation to redraw the district, then strict scrutiny
" ' Under strict scrutiny, "the State must justify its districtwould apply.14
ing decision by establishing that it was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest, such as complying with § 2 of the Voting Rights
Act."' 4 2 However, strict scrutiny would not apply if race was simply one
motivating factor, among others, to redraw the district.' 4 3
Applying this test to a political gerrymandering case, Justice Stevens
would require that "if a plaintiff carried her burden of demonstrating that
redistricters subordinated neutral districting principles to political considerations and that their predominant motive was to maximize one party's
power,"' 44 she would satisfy the improper purpose prong of the constitutional test.
With regard to the improper effects prong, a plaintiff would have to
demonstrate three facts: 1) under the old plan, her preferred candidate
won election; 2) her residence was redistricted into a non-competitive
"safe" district for the opposite party; and, 3) her new district is not as
compact as her old district. 4 5
The first two facts required would measure whether the plaintiff has
been harmed by the congressional district being redrawn, while the third

139. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (establishing the required component that a plaintiff have standing to challenge a redistricting plan in court).
140. See id. (outlining the "improper purpose and effect" test).
141. See Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. at 2642 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
142. King v. Illinois Bd. of Elections, 979 F. Supp. 619 (N.D. Ill. 1997), aff'd 522 U.S.
1087 (1998).
143. See Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 241 (2001) (quoting Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S.
952, 958 (1996)) (limiting the application of strict scrutiny, even where race is a motivating
factor in the redistricting process).
144. Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. at 2642-43 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (demonstrating
how a plaintiff would satisfy the improper purpose component of the two-pronged test).
145. Id. at 2643.
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fact would provide evidence that146the district was redrawn in a manipulative and discriminatory manner.
If a plaintiff with standing meets the improper purpose and improper
effects prongs of the test, then the "plaintiff would clearly have demonstrated a violation of her" rights under the Constitution and other federal
7
law.

14

Applying the test to CD 24, plaintiffs redistricted out of CD 24 can
demonstrate that the Texas Legislature's new map violated their constitutional rights by dismantling their former district. First, there are plaintiffs
who currently reside in four districts who previously lived in CD 24, and
would therefore have proper standing. Second, plaintiffs could satisfy
their burden by proving that the predominant purpose in redrawing their
148
congressional district was to achieve partisan gain.
In his dissent, Justice Stevens elaborated:
[A]n impermissible, predominantly partisan, purpose motivated the
cracking of former District 24 is further demonstrated by the fact
that, in my judgment, this cracking caused [the 2003 redistricting
plan] to violate § 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c. The
State's willingness to adopt a plan that violated its legal obligations
under the Voting Rights Act, combined with the other indicia of partisan intent in this litigation, is compelling evidence that politics was
not simply one factor in the cracking of District 24, but rather that it
1 49
was an impermissible, predominant factor.
Applying the burden-shifting test outlined above would enable courts
to fairly and consistently assess the constitutionality of redrawn congressional districts that have been challenged by voters and candidates who
have been adversely impacted by the process. The existence of such a
clear test would also provide guidelines by which state legislatures could
conduct the process by which they redraw congressional districts. However, in the case of the Texas Legislature, greater reforms in the congressional redistricting process are necessary before the 2010 census is
released.

146. Id.
147. Id.

148. See id. (demonstrating how a plaintiff would satisfy the burden of proving a predominant partisan purpose in the redrawing of their congressional district).
149. Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. at 2644 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (explaining why the
dismantling of CD 24 would be a violation of the Voting Rights Act under this proposed
judicial test).
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Step 3: Procedural Reform: Establish a Texas Redistricting Commission
The Texas Legislature should institute reform in the time, place, and
manner by which it redraws congressional districts. Comprehensive reformation would serve the Legislature's interest and public approval,
while conserving state revenue for the taxpayers and protecting the rights
of the state's voters. Genuine reform of the redistricting process, however, would require it to be taken out of the purview of the Texas Legislature entirely.
State Senator Jeff Wentworth, during each of the last seven legislative
sessions in the Texas Senate, introduced legislation that would establish a
bipartisan commission to do the "heavy lifting" in the redistricting process.15 ° Similar House bills have been introduced in the 80th legislative
session. 15 ' Although the proposed reforms take steps in the right direction of redistricting reform, most fall short of achieving the needs of
Texas voters. This comment proposes an amendment to the Texas Constitution 152 that would establish a Texas Redistricting Commission (hereinafter the "Commission"). This Commission would be responsible for

150. See Editorial, Common-sense Way to Draw New Districts; Legislators Should Not
Be in the Business of Drawing Congressional Districts- or Their Own, SAN ANTONIO ExPRESS-NEWS,

May 15, 2003, at 6B (editorializing that if legislators had passed Sen.

Wentworth's legislation, the Legislature would not have become paralyzed by redistricting). "For the sixth consecutive legislative session, Wentworth, a San Antonio Republican,
has filed legislation proposing a constitutional amendment that would establish a bipartisan Texas Redistricting Commission." Id. "Redistricting is the ugliest, most partisan business conducted by the Legislature, regardless of which party is in control . . . . As
Wentworth put it, the minority never gets a fair deal when the majority draws the lines."
Id. "Under the Wentworth proposal, House Republicans and House Democrats each
would select two members of the commission. Senate Republicans and Senate Democrats
would do the same." Id. "Redistricting plans would have to win the support of at least five
voting members of the commission [which] would lead to more balanced districts with fair
input from both parties. The result would be more competitive races and less gerrymandering for partisan advantage." Id. "Since the decisions wouldn't be made in the Legislature, Texas would avoid divisive squabbles such as the one impeding all other business in
the Texas House. The job of drawing legislative districts would take place without selfinterested incumbents seeking to preserve their own power." Id. "The real winners would
be the disgusted voters." Id.
151. See Tex. H.R.J. Res. 22, 80th Leg., R.S. (2007) (proposing an amendment to the
Texas Constitution to establish a redistricting commission to draw legislative and congressional districts). The proposed amendment would form a seven-member commission that
would adopt redistricting maps based on U.S. census data by approval of five of the seven
members. Id.; see also Tex. H.B. 112, 80th Leg., R.S. (2007) (providing another example of
a bill to reform the redistricting process through the establishment of an independent redistricting commission). H.B. 112, introduced by Rep. Mark Strama, would if enacted,
outline the duties and functions of the commission. Id.
152. See TEX. CONST. art. XVII (outlining the method required to amend the Texas
Constitution).
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drawing congressional districts in bipartisan fashion, on a regular decennial basis, based on up-to-date census data, and oversight from the people
of Texas.
The Commission would be comprised of nine members, and chaired by
the Texas Redistricting Commissioner, who would be directly elected by
Texas voters in the general election in each year ending in the number
"0." Four seats of the Commission would be reserved for members of the
Texas Legislature. These positions would be filled by the most senior
member of each of the two political parties in each chamber of the Texas
Legislature. In the event that there are more than one senior member in
each chamber, each chamber would vote to determine which one would
fill the seat. Two retired federal judges would also occupy two "judicial"
seats on the Commission. The judges would be required to have been
appointed by presidents of different political parties to retain a degree of
bipartisan balance on the Commission. The judges would be appointed
by the commissioner, but would be required to receive approval from
three of the four legislators sitting on the Commission before taking their
position on the panel. The last two seats on the Commission would be
occupied by experience demographers who would be competent to analyze population shifts within the state and could determine how congressional districts could be best apportioned in a consistent and efficient
manner. The demographers would be appointed by the commissioner
and would be required to be confirmed by no fewer than four of the six
legislators and judges on the commission.

(a) The Legislature, at any regular session, or at any special session when the matter is
included within the purposes for which the session is convened, may propose amendments revising the Constitution, to be voted upon by the qualified voters for statewide
offices and propositions, as defined in the Constitution and statutes of this State ....
The proposal for submission must be approved by a vote of two-thirds of all the members elected to each House, entered by yeas and nays on the journals. (b) A brief
explanatory statement of the nature of a proposed amendment, together with the date
of the election and the wording of the proposition as it is to appear on the ballot, shall
be published twice in each newspaper in the State which meets requirements set by
the Legislature for the publication of official notices of offices and departments of the
state government. The explanatory statement shall be prepared by the Secretary of
State and shall be approved by the Attorney General. The Secretary of State shall
send a full and complete copy of the proposed amendment or amendments to each
county clerk who shall post the same in a public place in the courthouse at least 30
days prior to the election on said amendment ....

(c) The election shall be held in

accordance with procedures prescribed by the Legislature, and the returning officer in
each county shall make returns to the Secretary of State of the number of legal votes
cast at the election for and against each amendment. If it appears from the returns
that a majority of the votes cast have been cast in favor of an amendment, it shall
become a part of this Constitution, and proclamation thereof shall be made by the
Governor. Id.
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Once properly in place, the Commission would be charged with drawing the Texas congressional districts in a manner consistent with the
United States Constitution, the laws of the United States, and the laws of
the state of Texas. The Commission would have two months to draw the
boundaries of the congressional districts from the date the United States
Census Bureau released its data.
The Commission's drafted plan or plans would each be accompanied
by a report. The reports must include:1 53
1) for each district in the plan, the total population and the percentage deviation from the average district population;
2) an explanation of the criteria used in developing the plan, with a
justification of any population deviation in a district from the average district population; [and]
3) a map or maps of all the districts[.]15 4
After the maps and reports have been drafted, the Commission would
be required to hold public hearings across the state of Texas, subject to
the Texas Open Meetings Act. 55 After seeking public input regarding
the proposed plan or plans through the hearings and any other means, the
Commission would be required to consider any valid and legal proposals
that would strengthen the plan.
One state representative in the 80th Session proposed a bill that would
compel disclosure of redistricting data. 5 6 Full disclosure is necessary and
would be included in the proposed amendment to the Texas Constitution.
Essentially, the Commission would be required to make available to the
public, via the Internet, "all plans submitted.., hearing transcripts, minutes of meetings, maps, narrative descriptions of proposed district, and
other data used ....

153. See Tex. H.B. 112, 80th Leg., R.S. (2007) (proposing a form that should be prepared for each district in a plan adopted by a redistricting commission).
154. Id. (outlining the criteria that would be included in the report).
155. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 551.002 (Vernon 2004) ("Every regular, special, or
called meeting of a governmental body shall be open to the public[.]"); see also Office of
the Attorney General of Texas, Open Meetings 2006 Handbook, http://
www.oag.state.tx.us/AGPublications/pdfs/openmeeting-hb2006.pdf ("The Texas Open
Meetings law was adopted to make governmental decision-making accessible to the public.
It requires meetings of governmental bodies to be open to the public.., and to be preceded by public notice of the time, place and subject matter of the meeting.").
156. See Tex. H.B. 112, 80th Leg., R.S. (2007) (proposing transparency in the process
so that the public can be knowledgeable about how changes are made in they way that they
are represented and to minimize manipulation and abuse of the process by government
officials who redraw the state's congressional districts).
157. Id. (requiring the disclosure of redistricting data through appropriate means to
the public).
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The Commission would then be required to adopt one map consisting
of validly-drawn congressional districts. Adoption of the new congressional districts would require the affirmative vote of no fewer than seven
of the nine members of the Commission. The map of the new congressional districts must be adopted no later than one month prior to the
adjournment sine die of the regular session of the Texas Legislature in the
year immediately following the release of the census data. The Commission's adopted redistricting plan would become effective by operation of
law upon adjournment of the regular session of the Legislature unless
both houses specifically reject the Commission's adopted plan by a twothirds majority.
The redistricting plan would take effect during the elections immediately succeeding adoption by the Texas Redistricting Commission. The
Commission would only reconvene if the adopted plan is found to be
repugnant to the United States Constitution or other federal law. The
entire process would be repeated beginning with the election of a new
Texas Redistricting Commissioner and the next decade's census data.
Congressional redistricting has a menacing impact on American governance and the ability of the people to be adequately represented in the
political process. The 2003 redistricting episode in Texas is a classic case
study of the phenomenon, and the LULAC decision failed to provide either a remedy to the problem or a measure to prevent future voting rights
violations. The three steps articulated above in this comment provide the
crucial steps that must be taken collectively by the state of Texas and the
federal courts regarding the redrawing of congressional districts. First,
the scope of redistricting must be limited to one which must serve a legitimate public interest. Second, the courts must apply a burden-shifting test
to assess the constitutionality of redistricting plans. Third, the voters of
Texas must amend their state's constitution to establish a commission that
will work with all parties in a transparent manner to redraw congressional
districts in a utilitarian manner that comports with the laws of the land.
V.

CONCLUSION

This comment reviewed the 2003 redistricting saga in Texas by explaining the questionable means by which it produced a partisan-gerrymandered congressional map in the middle of a decade for the sole
purpose of expanding the power of the Republican Party. The aftermath
of that redistricting saga impacted Texas voters in profound ways, particularly the Latino community in CD 23 and African-American voters in CD
24.
The litigation that ensued ended in the United States Supreme Court,
where it was decided that mid-decade redistricting is frowned upon, but
nonetheless constitutional. The Court also found that CD 23 was
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redrawn in a way that violated the rights of the district's Latino voters
under § 2 of the Voting Rights Act, but a nearly identical claim by African-American voters in CD 24 was found not to be a violation.
To remedy the inherent problems of the process of redistricting in
Texas, and the jurisprudence of voting rights and constitutional complaints as a result of redistricting, this comment proposed a three step
process to remedy the problem: 1) redraw districts only to serve the public, 2) adjudicate complaints using a fair burden-shifting test, and 3) establish a Texas Redistricting Commission to promote fairness and openness
in the process.
Observers have argued that the Voting Rights Act was signed into law
to protect voters against past injustices relating to the franchise and to
protect the right to actually cast a ballot. They also contend that Texas
redistricting does not prevent anyone from casting a ballot and this does
not trigger the protections provided by the Voting Rights Act.
Redistricting is certainly not a poll tax or a literacy test, but efforts to
suppress minority voting rights have always been adapted to circumvent
the spirit of the law. Redistricting is perhaps the Twenty-first century's
version of the poll tax or literacy test. Nonetheless, the Voting Rights Act
protects not only the right to cast a ballot in an election, but also protects
the right of the voter to have their vote count equally-meaning that vote
has an equal opportunity to help elect the voter's candidate of choice.
Observers also argued that the 2003 redistricting of Texas was necessary to right the wrongs of previous gerrymandering of the state's congressional districts-that the 2003 map is the one that actually reflects the
true politics of Texas. Certainly, the 1991 map was drawn with gerrymandered districts to benefit the Democratic Party, but the 2001 map
drawn by the panel of three federal judges was perhaps the fairest map in
Texas history-and it was drawn to give the Republican Party an advantage by drawing the two newly added districts in predominantly Republican regions in the state. However, it was the voters, not the map that sent
more Democrats than Republicans to Congress because voters split' 5 8
their votes between the parties. 159 Republican voters would often vote to

158. See BENJAMIN GINSBERG, THEODORE J. Lowi & MARGARET WEIR, WE THE
PEOPLE: AN INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN POLITICS 365 (1999) (explaining that split-

ticket voting occurs when a voter supports candidates from different parties on the same
ballot).
159. See ROGER H. DAVIDSON & WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONGRESS AND ITS MEMBERS

124 (7th ed., 2000).
[V]oters seeking different attributes in presidents and lawmakers, often find those attributes in candidates of different parties. Americans harbor inconsistent views about
government, its benefits, and its burdens. Republican officeholders have purveyed a
rhetoric of limited government . . . while Democrats in elective office have tradition-
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re-elect their Democratic congressmen, and so the map that favored
Republicans did not immediately send more Republicans to Congress.
Furthermore, if the 2003 map sought to correct a prior injustice, it did so
through injustice to the opposite extreme.
Regarding the proposed Texas Redistricting Commission, a critic will
argue that the Commission would concentrate power into a handful of
individuals to make crucial decisions regarding congressional redistricting. The Commission certainly limits the number of players within the
government, but it tempers that concentration of power with checks, balances, and direct oversight by the voters of Texas. The appointment and
approval process makes the members of the Commission accountable to
one another, the public hearings and election of the commissioner ensure
accountability to the people, and the possibility of a legislative veto provides a role for the Legislature. Retired federal judges would be able to
provide legal analysis, and specialized demographers would bring practical expertise. The Commission would be designed to operate with transparency, fairness, and accountability. Most importantly, the Commission
would require a great degree of consensus to take action. Bipartisan consensus prevents extremism from dominating or hijacking the process.
Redistricting creates many problems. 6 ° In Texas in 2003, it violated
the rights of minority voters. It threw the Texas Legislature into chaos,
ally promoted government services that voters favor. Egged on by candidates' appeals, voters are encouraged to think they can have their cake and eat it too. This
account of voters' behavior provides a commonsense explanation for [ticket-splitting].
Id.
160. See Editorial, The Soviet Republic of Texas, WASH. POST, Oct. 14, 2003, at A22.
You might think America's rigged system of congressional elections couldn't get much
worse. Self-serving redistricting schemes nationwide already have left an overwhelming number of seats in the House of Representatives so uncompetitive that election
results are practically as preordained as in the old Soviet Union. In the last election,
for example, 98% of incumbents were reelected, and the average winning candidate
got more than 70% of the vote. More candidates ran without any major-party opposition than won by a margin of less than 20%. Yet even given this record, the justcompleted Texas congressional redistricting plan represents a new low .

. .

. Texas

Republicans, egged on by U.S. House Majority Leader Tom DeLay, violated a longstanding tradition by redrawing the map in the middle of a census cycle. Their new
rule seems to be, why wait 10 years if you can cram something down your opponents'
throats today? And their plan is designed to wipe out moderate and white Democrats
from the Texas congressional delegation ....

[I]t will aggravate the triumph of ex-

tremes in Washington while further sovietizing America's already-fixed electoral game
....

The goal here is not subtle ....

The pernicious effect of partisan redistricting in

general is the weakening of the center with the creation of "safe" seats for both parties-which encourages the election of people considerably to the left or right of the
state's political center of gravity. Do Texans really want a polarized delegation of 22
conservative Republicans and 10 liberal Democrats, as the current plan envisions? Do
they really want a state with a white party and a minority party? Republican politi-
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and forced it to break its own rules, operate in secret, and contaminate
cooperation by operating under authoritarian partisanship.
In an ideal world, congressional districts would only be drawn once, but
population growth and shifting make redistricting a necessity. The threestep solution proposed by this comment would avoid the pitfalls of redistricting by prohibiting it, except when it is necessary to serve a legitimate
public interest such as the release of decennial census data. When a complaint arises because of redistricting, the courts should be able to address
the issue and provide or deny relief accordingly. The Court was not able
to do this in LULAC, but the burden-shifting test proposed in this comment would allow the courts to adjudicate future claims. The proposed
burden-shifting test would allow the lower courts to have a clear standard
by which to uniformly apply the law to balance states' rights with the
voting rights and constitutional rights of voters, and it would also provide
states like Texas with a clear blueprint explaining what is and what is not
a violation of the laws of the United States. The Texas Redistricting
Commission would empower the people of Texas to exercise their voice
in redistricting and would avoid making the process an absolutely partisan free-for-all in the Texas Legislature. The Commission would require
consensus in the interest of the voters of Texas rather than in the interest
of partisan political power plays.
"He who has the gold makes the rules, without regard for what is done
to others," should no longer be the Golden Rule in redistricting Texas.
The right to vote is as valuable as gold in a democracy, and should not be
played as if it were a pawn by a state legislature. For the original Golden
Rule to again prevail in Texas, voting rights must be returned to minority
communities-or the voting rights of all Texans will continue to be redistricted away.

cians are engineering it that way, whatever voters may want. For redistricting-quite
the inverse of elections-is a process in which politicians get to choose their voters. It
is a process that a healthy democracy would seek to reform. Id.
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